The improving economic situation in Russia: reality or creative statistics? OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 240 | 05.05.2017 by Wiśniewska, Iwona
1OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 240
www.osw.waw.plCentre for Eastern Studies NUMBER 240 | 05.05.2017
Iwona Wiśniewska
The indicators published in recent months by the Russian Statistics Office (Rosstat) are much 
more optimistic than the estimates and forecasts announced several months earlier. A sig-
nificant improvement in statistical data is evident in particular regarding the figures for GDP 
and industrial production. According to new information, over the last two years (2015-2016) 
the Russian economy shrank by 3%, and not by 4.5% as previously estimated. Moreover, data 
compiled by Rosstat show an increase in industrial production was registered, even in the face 
of a decline in citizens’ income and fixed investment. In addition, the slowdown in the indus-
trial sector was found to have ended at the beginning of 2016 and not at the end of 2016 as 
previously reported.
The improvement of economic indicators can undoubtedly be attributed to certain  objective 
factors, including taking into account more detailed data or a change in methodology, which 
is a natural element of the process of compiling statistical data. However, the scale of the 
change and the lack of professionalism on the part of Rosstat, including the manner of pre-
senting the data, its failure to observe the deadlines for issuing publications and selective in-
clusion of data, undermine the credibility of the presented figures. Therefore, increasing cau-
tion is advised when interpreting these data. Doubts regarding the quality of the indicators 
presented by Rosstat make the assessment of Russia’s actual economic situation increasingly 
difficult. As a consequence, reservations towards the Russian statistics office seem to be all 
the more justified. These suggest that Rosstat is under political pressure from the Kremlin and 
that these new, improved statistics meet the government’s propaganda-motivated demand 
for information. Ahead of the upcoming presidential election planned for March 2018, the 
government would like to emphasise its effectiveness, such as by efficiently overcoming the 
crisis and stabilising the economic situation in Russia.
The new macroeconomic data
The GDP figures Rosstat presented on 1 Febru-
ary 2017 took Russia by surprise. They turned 
out to be much more optimistic than the esti-
mates and forecasts published previously be-
cause they reported a mere 0.2% drop in GDP 
in 2016. It is noteworthy that the Ministry of 
Economic Development (MED) of the Russian 
Federation was among the recipients who were 
the most astonished by Rosstat’s publication. 
Just two days prior, on 30 January 2017, MED 
had published its own assessment of Russia’s 
economic development in 2016, based on pre-
vious partial data compiled by Rosstat. The GDP 
drop reported by MED was 0.6%1.  
At the same time, Rosstat announced another 
update regarding GDP figures for 2015, in which 
1 In late December 2016, the Central Bank of Russia was 
another institution that published its assessment of the 
development of economic situation in Russia. Its figures 
show that in 2016 Russia’s GDP declined by 0.5%-0.7%.
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it reduced the decline in GDP to 2.8%. The pre-
vious update of the indicator announced one 
month earlier (on 9 January 2017) reported 
a GDP drop of 3%, whereas the figure reported 
in the initial assessment published in February 
2016 was 3.7%2. According to the revised data, 
over the last two years (2015-2016) the Russian 
economy shrank by 3% and not by 4.5% as pre-
viously estimated.
Presenting its indicator for the whole of 2016, 
Rosstat chose not to publish data for Q4 2016 
and removed from its website certain quarterly 
data including those taking account of season-
al trends (which are of key importance for pre-
paring a proper assessment of general trends) 
for 2012-2016, stating the need to update them 
as a reason. The new version of these quarterly 
data was published on the office’s website on 
28 March 2017. According to the most recent 
assessment, in Q4 2016 the Russian economy 
recorded an increase for the first time in two 
years (see Appendix).
However, it should be emphasised that season-
ally adjusted quarterly data have not yet been 
published and the most recent quarter covered 
by the previous version of the report, which is 
no longer available, was Q1 2016. In a letter to 
Russian economist Sergey Aleksashenko3, who 
had inquired why these data were not available, 
Rosstat admitted that it had ceased to calculate 
2 http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/vvp/vvp-god/
tab3.htm, 24 March 2016
3 Sergey Aleksashenko, at present one of the biggest critics 
of the quality of Russian statistics, former deputy minis-
ter of finance of the Russian Federation, former deputy 
governor of the Central Bank of Russia, former director 
for macroeconomic research at the Higher School of Eco-
nomics. He left Russia in 2013. At present, he is a senior 
fellow in global economy and development at the Wash-
ington-based think tank Brookings Institution.
this indicator and stated that it is not known 
when these data will again be published4.
Significant changes have also been recorded 
for industrial production. The relevant figures 
for 2015-2016 have been recalculated using the 
new method the office has applied since 2017 
(the previous years have not been recalculated). 
The new data shows that in 2015 industrial pro-
duction declined by a mere 0.8% and not by 
3.4% as previously reported, whereas in 2016 it 
increased by 1.3% (in previous assessments the 
figure was 1.1%). It is noteworthy that January 
2016 was the final month of industrial produc-
tion decline (year-on-year), whereas the previ-
ous statistics had recorded the first signs of an 
increase in October 2016.  
The reasons behind the changes in sta-
tistics and the doubts surrounding them
Explanations provided by Rosstat regarding 
the evident indicator changes have been unsat-
isfactory. The office was unable to define the 
specific causes underlying the new figures. This 
has triggered expert debates across Russia and 
a wave of criticism focused on the office, which 
has served to undermine its reputation.
Due to the complexity of the process of gath-
ering statistical data and devising tools and 
models for their analysis, generalisations are 
necessary since measuring the processes in the 
economy in a precise manner is extremely dif-
ficult. The indicators reflect approximate values 
only, therefore they are revised as new infor-
mation becomes available (the IMF allows for 
5 revisions/updates of GDP figures). As Rosstat 
explains, the new higher GDP figure was calcu-
lated taking into account the economic results 
recorded in the small business sector and this 
sector’s increased share in Russia’s GDP (an in-
crease of 0.5 p.p. to 19.5%). The improvement 
of GDP figures for 2015 was also possible due 
to a recalculation of the share of the sector “of 
public administration and defence” in Russia’s 
4 Sergey Aleksashenko, 7 February 2017, http://www.sal-
eksashenko.com/2017/02/blog-post_7.html
The unsatisfactory explanations of the 
reasons behind the improvement of GDP 
figures have triggered a wave of criticism 
towards Rosstat, which undermined its 
reputation and credibility.
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GDP. Prior to the recalculation the sector’s add-
ed value had been declining, whereas after the 
revision an increase of 3.4% was reported5. Rus-
sian media speculates that the increase may be 
the result of increased supplies of armaments 
and military equipment to Syria in mid-2015 in-
tended for the Syrian army6.
Changes of methodology are necessary in the 
process of compiling statistical data. According 
to Rosstat, this has also impacted the indica-
tors. Since 2014, the Russian statistics office has 
been in the process of changing its methodolo-
gy for calculating GDP to adjust it to European 
standards (System of National Accounts 2008). 
It is a long-lasting process and over subsequent 
years new elements are being taken into ac-
count7. The change of methodology has also 
occurred as regards the industrial production 
indicator. On 1 January 2017 Rosstat switched 
to the European classification of business ac-
tivity: instead of the three types used previ-
ously, it now distinguishes four types of such 
activity8; similarly, the classification of types of 
production in specific areas of business activity 
has also been changed. Despite the fact that 
the change of methodology had been planned 
for a long time and the relevant preparations 
took three years, Rosstat turned out to be far 
from professional when implementing it (a sim-
ilar situation occurred a few years ago when 
the previous change of classification standards 
was being introduced). This resulted in delays in 
publishing the indicators in February and March 
2017. Aside from technical problems with data 
5 h t t p : / / p u b d o c s . w o r l d b a n k . o r g / e n / 
929081485202085208/Russia-Monthly-Economic-De-
velopments-Jan-2017-rus.pdf
6 ht tps: / /w w w.vedomost i . ru /economics /ar t ic les / 
2017/01/09/672165-rosstat-itogi-2015
7 The data for 2016 take into account the standards for 
assessing housing services, whereas data regarding for-
eign trade and investment are calculated on the basis of 
the Russian Federation’s balance of payments.
8 At present, Russian statistics distinguish four (former-
ly three) types of activity: 1. mining of natural resources; 
2. the processing industry; 3. generation and supply of elec-
tricity, gas, steam and hot water; 4. supply of water; waste-
water and waste management; rehabilitation. Formerly, the 
latter two items were combined into one. The change also 
involved shifting certain industries to other sections.
transfer, another difficulty was the insufficient 
level or preparedness of respondents (compa-
nies) to the new manner of reporting data after 
the change of production codes.
In parallel with the introduction of the new 
classification standards, Rosstat introduced 
changes regarding the share of specific sectors 
and industries in the general industrial produc-
tion indicator (for example, the significance of 
the mining sector, which recorded an increase, 
has risen). Alongside this, a new ‘perfected’ 
variant of the basket of representative goods 
has been applied, including new items and 
a change in their selection, which de facto mod-
ified its composition. Therefore, it is impossible 
to compare indicators if they have not been re-
calculated according to the new methodology.
Another argument cited by Rosstat as a poten-
tial reason behind the changing data has been 
the switch in April 2016 to calculating GDP and 
its components on the basis of prices recorded 
in 2011, whereas previously the reference year 
for these calculations had been 2008 (the refer-
ence year changes every four years). However, 
this change is unlikely to have had a major im-
pact on the value of indicators.
Rosstat’s statistics raise doubts also due to the 
increasingly selective manner of their publi-
cation. Aside from quarterly GDP data taking 
account of seasonal trends, whose publication 
was discontinued in the spring of 2016 (in Feb-
ruary 2017 they were removed from Rosstat’s 
website), monthly data regarding investments 
have also been unavailable since spring 2016; at 
present this indicator is presented on a quarter-
ly basis only. In addition, since 2015 Rosstat has 
ceased to publish the indicator showing public 
sector salaries as a percentage of average salary 
Numerous changes introduced over the 
last year in Russian statistics have made 
it practically impossible to compare indi-
cators published in previous years
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offered in specific regions. The statistics office 
has offered no explanation for its decision. Un-
doubtedly, the fact that this indicator is una-
vailable hinders the assessment of the level of 
implementation by regional government of the 
so-called May decrees issued by President Pu-
tin in 2012 which aimed to raise public sector 
salaries by 2018. The reference threshold for 
salary rises is the average salary offered in the 
region (for example average salaries of physi-
cians and academic teachers should amount to 
200% of the average salary in the region). For 
several years now it has been evident that as 
a consequence of the dwindling financial re-
sources due to the crisis no such major salary 
rises will be possible in most of the regions. 
In 2015, Rosstat additionally changed the meth-
odology for calculating average salaries in spe-
cific regions, which resulted in this indicator 
being reduced. Income earned in the informal 
sector, where salaries are not registered in any 
way, such as from hired labour in households 
and farms, has been taken into account in av-
erage salary calculations. Income earned in this 
sector tends to be considerably lower than sal-
aries offered in the formal sector. At the same 
time, attempts at its assessment are extremely 
difficult and quite arbitrary. The reduction of 
the average salary in specific regions has clearly 
supported the implementation of the May de-
crees because salary rises did not have to be 
that significant any more9.
9 Правительство «понизит» среднюю зарплату 
ради  майских указов Путина, RBK 18 September 
2015, http://www.rbc.ru/economics/18/09/2015/55f-
c2a639a79474172f2c597
It should also be noted that certain problems 
with Russian statistics may result from the fact 
that some of the data provided to Rosstat is 
classified, in particular data referring to the 
activity of the military and industrial complex 
and the law enforcement agencies. This is em-
phasised by some Russian experts10. The office 
chooses not to publish these data directly but 
to ‘dilute’ them in the remaining macroeco-
nomic data instead. 
The political determinants of statistics
The fact that the statistics office, which is 
a state institution, is supervised by politicians, 
who are high-ranking state officials, encour-
ages these politicians to influence the results 
of the office’s work. This is because they are 
responsible for the implementation of the as-
sumptions of economic policy, and achieving 
the desired indicators is of crucial importance 
for them. This shows that professionalism on 
the part of statisticians is extremely important 
and empowerment of their superiors is neces-
sary for maintaining independence. Looking 
at Rosstat’s history one may get the impres-
sion that the office has repeatedly been sub-
ject to political pressure from the government. 
Examples of this include frequent changes of 
the bodies supervising the office introduced 
over the last 25 years. The office used to be 
supervised by the prime minister, the Ministry 
of Economic Development and other bodies. 
Since 2012, it has been under general super-
vision by the government, which was one of 
the suggestions formulated by the OECD (at 
the time when Russia was actively applying for 
membership of this organisation). According to 
OECD experts, direct supervision of Rosstat by 
the Ministry of Economic Development could 
create channels for impacting the indicators, 
which in turn would undermine the quality of 
statistics. Therefore, President Putin’s decision 
of 4 April 2017 to restore MED’s supervision of 
10 Sergey Aleksashenko, 7 February 2017, http://www.sal-
eksashenko.com/2017/02/blog-post_7.html
The Ministry of Economic Development, 
Rosstat’s main critic and an entity re-
sponsible for the attainment of the as-
sumed economic goals, has taken over 
control of the statistics office
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Rosstat is unlikely to foster an improvement in the 
quality and credibility of Russian statistics. This 
is particularly important because the ministry is 
responsible for the implementation of economic 
policy and for achieving the planned indicators.
In this context, it is understandable why in 
recent weeks the Ministry of Economic Devel-
opment has been one of the major critics of 
Rosstat and a proponent of its reform11. Min-
ister Maksim Oreshkin accused Rosstat of be-
ing unprofessional, publishing estimates on the 
basis of invalid data and obstructing the work 
of the entire government12. However, the min-
ister’s frustration and his reservations towards 
the office may have been the result of his min-
istry’s embarrassment in connection with the 
2016 GDP figures that it had presented in Jan-
uary 2017, two days before Rosstat issued its 
publication. The figure presented by the minis-
try turned out to be more pessimistic. The MED 
had not been alerted that the changes in data 
compiled by Rosstat would be so significant. In 
addition, the situation has aggravated the sta-
tus of this ministry in the Russian government 
(in November 2016 the former minister of eco-
nomic development, Aleksey Ulyukaev, was ar-
rested over corruption charges).
The Kremlin’s demand for positive economic 
indicators has been a much more significant 
factor in making the office yield to political 
pressure. The Russian ruling elite has already 
launched a propaganda campaign ahead of 
the presidential election planned for March 
2018, in which Vladimir Putin will likely be 
the main candidate. The president particularly 
cares about his high approval rating because 
it legitimises his actions. One of the slogans 
the Kremlin is reiterating in the pre-election 




12 Russia’s failure to observe publication deadlines has 
halted the MED’s work on updating Russia’s economic 
growth forecast for the whole year (it should have been 
prepared in March), so that the Finance Ministry could 
update its forecast regarding budget revenues and pre-
pare a draft state budget for the next year (the relevant 
bill should be submitted to parliament in autumn).
campaign involves offering a guarantee of po-
litical and socio-economic stability in Russia. 
Therefore, in its message it needs to reduce the 
scale of the crisis which affected Russia in late 
2014 and early 2015, and to convince society 
that its consequences have been overcome. Over 
the past year, Vladimir Putin and representa-
tives of the Ministry of Economic Development 
echoing his views have repeatedly announced 
that Russia managed to overcome the negative 
trends in its economy and combat recession13, 
in spite of the fact that previous official statis-
tics did not confirm this. Therefore, the new 
indicators presented by the office meet the de-
mand from the Kremlin. Moreover, the Russian 
government is using the fact of Rosstat pre-
senting positive macroeconomic trends as part 
of its propaganda targeting foreign recipients. 
The government is trying to shape Russia’s im-
age as a stable country which is resistant to ex-
ternal shocks, in particular the dramatic decline 
in oil prices and Western economic sanctions.
Conclusions
In the present political context in Russia, includ-
ing the upcoming presidential election planned 
for the spring of 2018, statistics is another issue 
the Russian leadership uses in its information 
policy disseminated via the media. The radical 
change of specific figures made by Rosstat over 
recent months is another element in the Krem-
13 Vladimir Putin said this for example during the Russia–
ASEAN summit in Sochi in May 2016; former econom-
ic development minister Aleksey Ulyukaev also spoke 
about it at this summit. The president reiterated this 
message in December 2016 during the annual press con-
ference.
The improvement of economic results 
effected by Rosstat meets the Kremlin’s 
determination to present socio-economic 
stability to society, which is particularly 
important ahead of the upcoming presi-
dential election.
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lin’s determination to show socio-economic sta-
bility to society. This boosts the impression that 
the improvement in statistical indicators is not 
just a result of taking external factors into ac-
count, including the methodology change and 
data update, but also a consequence of Rosstat 
yielding to political pressure from the Kremlin.
The lack of professionalism in presenting statis-
tical data and explaining the rationale behind 
the changes introduced is severely impacting 
Rosstat’s reputation and triggering doubts as 
to the quality of indicators it publishes. It is be-
coming increasingly difficult to assess the ac-
tual condition of the Russian economy. All the 
more so because some portion of the data does 
not get recalculated or is not published at all, 
which in turn makes it impossible to compare 
data and observe specific trends. Although an 
increasing number of institutions, including the 
central bank and commercial banks, which con-
duct their own market analyses, have confirmed 
that the situation in the Russian economy has 
improved, it remains the data provided by Ross-
tat that forms the basis for these analyses.
The fact is that an increasing number of symp-
toms (including the mood of company exec-
utives) herald the end of the recession in the 
Russian economy. However, the problem the 
Russian government is facing does not merely 
involve steering Russia out of the crisis, but also 
bringing it back to a stable growth path. The 
most recent forecasts for Russia are far from 
optimistic (the GDP growth rate in 2017 is esti-
mated at 0.5% provided that the price of oil is 
around US$ 40 per barrel, or 1-2% GDP with the 
oil price exceeding US$ 50 per barrel). Other 
forecasts herald a long period of stagnation 
or GDP growth of 1-2%, which de facto means 
that the distance between Russia and the 
world’s leading economic powers will increase. 
APPENDIX
The change in GDP assessment (annual and quarterly data) 












March 2017 December 2016
-3.7
2015












Annual data 2015 2016
03.2017 -2.8 -0.2
01.2016 -3.7 n/d*
* no data
